University of South Florida

Scholar Commons
Graduate Theses and Dissertations

Graduate School

12-12-2008

The Effect of a Reasoning Warning on Faking in Personality
Testing for Selection and the Perception of Procedural Justice
T Ryan Dullaghan
University of South Florida

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd
Part of the American Studies Commons

Scholar Commons Citation
Dullaghan, T Ryan, "The Effect of a Reasoning Warning on Faking in Personality Testing for Selection and
the Perception of Procedural Justice" (2008). Graduate Theses and Dissertations.
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/1619

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons.
For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.

The Effect of a Reasoning Warning on Faking in
Personality Testing for Selection and the Perception of Procedural Justice

by

T. Ryan Dullaghan

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
Department of Psychology
College of Arts and Sciences
University of South Florida

Major Professor: Walter Borman, Ph.D.
Stephen Stark, Ph.D.
Marcie Finkelstein, Ph.D.

Date of Approval:
December 12, 2008

Keywords: neuroticism, agreeableness, conscientiousness,
openness to experience, extraversion, impression management
© Copyright 2010, T. Ryan Dullaghan

Table of Contents
List of Tables

iii

Abstract

iv

Chapter One – Introduction
Faking Behavior
The Utility of Warnings
Procedural Justice
Identifying Faking
Self-Presentation/Direct Evidence
Mean Comparisons
Variance
Summary

1
2
6
10
13
13
16
17
17

Chapter Two – Method
Participants
Measures
Warning Prompts
Personality Test
Procedural Justice
Impression Management
Procedure

20
20
21
21
22
23
24
24

Chapter Three – Results
Comparison of Sources
Personality
Procedural Justice
Impression Management

26
26
28
36
38

Chapter Four – Discussion
Personality
Procedural Justice
Impression Management
Limitations
Future Research
Conclusion

39
39
41
42
43
44
46

References

47

i

Appendices
Appendix A: International Personality Item Pool Items
Appendix B: Procedural Justice Questionnaire Items
Appendix C: Selection Procedural Justice Scale Items
Appendix D: Impression Management Scale

ii

54
55
57
58
59

List of Tables
Table 1

Follow-up ANOVAs to Survey MANOVA: Full sample

27

Table 2

Follow-up ANOVAs to Source MANOVA: Full sample

27

Table 3

Means and standard deviations for Nurse and Student samples
for the IPIP

29

Means and standard deviations for Nurse and Student samples
for procedural justice

30

Table 5

Intercorrelations among study variables: Nurse sample

31

Table 6

Intercorrelations among study variables: Student sample

32

Table 7

Descriptive and ANOVA statistics with Tukey’s post hoc tests
for the personality variables: Nurse sample

35

Descriptive and t-test statistics for the procedural justice variables:
Nurse sample

37

Descriptive and t-test statistics for the procedural justice variables:
Student sample

38

Table 4

Table 8

Table 9

iii

The Effect of a Reasoning Warning on Faking in
Personality Testing for Selection and the Perception of Procedural Justice
T. Ryan Dullaghan
ABSTRACT
A major concern with using personality tests in the selection process is the
prevalence of applicant faking behavior which can influence the rank order of applicants
such that fakers are hired at an elevated frequency. This study examined the effects of the
detection/consequence warning and a more applicant-friendly warning on faking and
perceived procedural justice. I hypothesized that a positive warning (reasoning warning)
and a detection/consequence warning would show similar mean personality trait levels
compared to honest responses, with all means showing less socially desirable responding
than no warning prompt. Results suggested that the detection/consequence warning is
more effective at reducing faking behavior in the selection context, and the content of the
warning has no impact on perceived procedural justice.
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Chapter One
Introduction
Utilizing personality tests in the selection process has become increasingly
popular over the past decade and a half since the development of the five-factor model of
personality and research showing the validity of the five-factor model in predicting job
performance, organizational status, income, and a number of other variables (Barrick &
Mount, 1991; Mount & Barrick, 1995; Judge, Higgins, Thoreson, & Barrick, 1999; Tett,
Jackson, & Rothstein, 1991). In the early 1990s, meta-analyses demonstrated the
robustness of the Big Five personality factors of neuroticism, extraversion, openness to
experience, agreeableness, and conscientiousness (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Tett et al.,
1991). Not only have some of these personality traits been shown to predict job
performance, but personality can show high incremental validity above general mental
ability (GMA) in the prediction of job performance (Mount, Witt, & Barrick, 2000;
Schmidt & Hunter, 1998) compared to other selection procedures. Furthermore, unlike
GMAs, personality tests used for selection show little to no bias based on age, race, or
gender (Hough, Oswald, & Ployhart, 2001). Unfortunately, personality data can be faked
much more easily than other components of a selection battery (Donovan, Dwight, &
Hurtz, 2003).
Faking is intentionally distorting responses on a personality test so as to appear
higher or lower on a trait than the respondent’s true trait score (McFarland & Ryan,
2000). In most cases where respondents are motivated to distort their responses
1

(selection, assessment, classification), faking so as to appear less desirable may not be a
serious issue, so most research on the topic has focused on faking in the positive direction
(Jones & Abraham, 2008).
Warning prompts have been shown to be effective methods for reducing applicant
faking on personality tests. There is, however, evidence that applicants have a negative
perception of personality tests being used in the selection process (Rosse, Miller, &
Stecher, 1994), and adding a warning prompt appears to also elicit a negative response
from applicants (McFarland, 2003). McFarland did not, however, compare unwarned
conditions to the warned conditions.
Little research has examined the target of the applicant’s negative perceptions, but
the selection system (Rosse et al., 1994) and the organization (McFarland, 2003) have
been hypothesized to be potential targets. If currently used warnings do, in fact, harm
applicant perceptions of an organizational application process, these applicants could
potentially withdraw from the selection process, tell other prospective employees not to
apply to the organization, and/or enter the organization with a negative view of the
organization’s justice. New types of warnings that seek to improve applicant perceptions
of procedural justice could potentially mitigate the effects of including a personality test
in the selection battery. The purpose of this study is to examine the influence of a more
applicant-friendly warning on faking, as well as see if such a warning will improve
applicant perceptions of the use of a personality test in selection.
Faking Behavior
Presumably, applicants for a job are motivated to show themselves to be a
relatively ideal candidate for the organization. As such, applicants could be tempted to
2

distort their responses toward some conception of the type of person who best fits a given
job. Many studies have found higher (more socially desirable) personality trait group
means for faking groups than control/non-faking groups (Barrick & Mount, 1996; Hough,
1998; Rosse, Stecher, Miller, & Levin, 1998). Typically, this distortion is referred to as
faking, but various researchers have called it impression management, response
distortion, intentional distortion, social desirability, and dissimulation (McFarland &
Ryan, 2000).
In a sample of recent job applicants, Donovan et al. (2003) assessed the base rate
of applicant faking. The researchers created a survey asking participants whether or not
they had engaged in 29 faking activities during a recent job application process.
Responses showed that participants tended to fake the personality components of the
selection process more often than other components. Participants reported faking on
components relating to personality 27.8% to 53.8% of the time versus only 4.7% to 9.5%
for the biographical components. The aspects of personality addressed included
hardworking, prompt, and thorough (45.2%), dependability and reliability (29%),
agreeableness (27.8%), and downplaying negative attributes (53.8%). Biographical data
showed a much lower prevalence of faking – outright made up information (9.5%), listed
unearned rewards (4.7%), and exaggerated experience (7.7%). Thus it appears that
faking in personality testing may occur in a meaningful proportion of the job applicant
population.
There is still debate as to the effects of faking on the validity of personality
measures in employee selection (Barrick & Mount, 1996; McFarland & Ryan, 2000;
Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, & Thornton, 2003; Ones, Viswesvaran & Reiss, 1996).
3

Topping & O’Gorman (1997) found that for all Big Five traits but Agreeableness,
intentionally faked responses significantly decreased the validity of responses to the
NEO-FFI when compared to personality ratings from friends or family. On the other
hand, in a study using two applicant samples, Barrick and Mount (1996) found that when
correcting for response distortion, criterion-related validities against voluntary turnover
and job performance decreased, but not a significant amount. The validities were similar
despite the finding that the structural models correcting for either self-deception or
impression management fit better than the unadjusted model. In a meta-analysis of the
social desirability literature, Ones et al. (1996) found similar results regarding the
robustness of criterion-related validities, as have others (Hough, 1998; Hough, Eaton,
Dunnette, Kamp, & McCloy, 1990).
There is much evidence, however, that faking responses can change the rank order
of candidates. In selection scenarios with low selection ratios, this rank order is what will
determine who gets hired and who does not. Mueller-Hanson et al. (2003) simulated the
applicant process to examine the criterion-related validity and rank-order effects of
faking. For a control condition, there were no differences in the predictor-criterion
relationships among three achievement motivation subgroups (low, middle, and high
achievement motivation). For the faking condition, however, the personality-performance
relationship for the lower (r = .45) and upper thirds (r = .07) were significantly different.
Further, the applicants selected based on their rank-order on the non-cognitive measure
were consistently composed of more from the faking group than the control group. As the
selection ratio decreased, the proportion of faking group members selected increased, and
thus the error in selection. An increase in the error in selection due to faking has been
4

found consistently in other research looking at the effect of faking on rank-order
(Ellingson, Sackett, & Hough, 1999; Hough, 1998; Komar, Brown, Komar, & Robie,
2008; Rosse et al., 1998).
There is evidence that faking affects the psychometric properties of personality
tests such that the Five-Factor structure does not always fit faked responses. Schmit and
Ryan (1993) hypothesized that personality factor structure would depend on the purpose
of the test administration. Two such conditions include a simple for-research-only
examination of personality, or as used in a selection battery. Results showed that the Five
Factor structure fit better for student (voluntary) samples than applicant (involuntary)
samples. In the applicant sample, an “ideal-employee factor” (Schmit and Ryan, 1993,
pp. 971) appeared in the factor analysis, reflecting several work-related traits. The
authors believe the NEO-FFI’s five broad personality traits may not be accurately applied
in employee selection. Furthermore, the subscales of the NEO-FFI showed complex
loading patterns, so these subscales should also be used cautiously when assessing
applicant responses.
Smith, Hanges, and Dickson (2001), on the other hand, found no changes in factor
structure using the HPI between student, applicant, and incumbent samples. Marshall, de
Fruyt, Rolland, and Bagby (2005) similarly found that the factor structure on the NEOPI-R remained stable across applicant and non-applicant groups. Unexpectedly, in Smith
et al.’s (2001) study, the model fit the applicant sample better than the student sample, in
disagreement with Schmit and Ryan’s (1993) findings. Unfortunately, I have found no
further studies seeking to resolve the differences between Schmit and Ryan and Smith et
al.’s findings.
5

Potential inconsistency of factor structures has serious implications for the utility
of personality tests in the selection setting. Consider conscientiousness, the trait most
often found to be related to job performance across occupations. If items used in creating
the composite conscientiousness score do not fit in the conscientiousness latent factor, the
inclusion of such items may introduce noise into the predictor-criterion relationship, thus
reducing this relationship.
The Utility of Warnings
As alluded to above, items on most personality tests are somewhat transparent. On
most measures, a general knowledge of the Big-Five model will enable respondents to
identify which trait each item reflects, and therefore determine how to fake their
responses to the item, should they choose to do so. Rees and Metcalfe (2003) found that
36% of participants thought it was easy to fake on a personality questionnaire, and
another 36% did not find faking unethical. Wolford and Christiansen (2008) approached
the fakeability issue from a slightly different perspective. With the increasing popularity
of personality measures being used in the workplace, books have appeared that coach
readers on how to fake personality tests. In the Wolford and Christiansen study, the
authors provided some participants with sections of a book that coached readers how to
improve their scores on a personality test; another group did not receive this material.
During the testing session, all participants were told to respond to the personality test as if
they were applying for a car salesman position. Results showed that those who read the
coaching materials did show higher mean scores for extraversion and conscientiousness
than those who did not receive the coaching materials. The results suggest that with
knowledge of what a personality test is asking for, and the motivation to fake,
6

participants can distort their responses in such a way as to increase their overall scores on
the test.
There has been a great deal of research the past decade or so looking into how to
reduce such distortion. Although faking has been found to affect applicant rank-order and
the scale’s psychometric properties (as discussed above), researchers have developed
methods for dealing with applicant faking behavior. Warnings have been shown to
effectively reduce the prevalence of faking in the application process (Dwight &
Donovan, 2003). For many personality traits, mean scores for the warned conditions were
significantly lower than for the unwarned condition. However, a recent study comparing
honest, faked, and warned groups suggests that warning the applicant not to fake may not
reduce test scores down to the same level as the honest condition (Donovan, Dwight, &
Schneider, 2008). Research needs to be conducted looking more precisely at how
warnings impact personality test scores.
McFarland and Ryan (2000) provided a model of the applicant faking process to
describe the way variables interact to create variance in faking on non-cognitive
measures. First in the model are influences on beliefs toward faking, including values,
morals, religion, personality traits, etc. These influences then affect an individual’s
beliefs toward faking, which in turn determine an individual’s intention to fake. The
relationship between beliefs toward faking and intention to fake, however, is moderated
by situational influences such as desire for the job and warnings. Intention to fake’s
relationship with faking behavior is moderated by both the ability to fake (selfmonitoring, knowledge of the construct being measured, and item transparency) and the
opportunity to fake. Opportunity to fake addresses the limitation for fakers that those
7

already high on the trait may not be able to positively distort their responses. Finally, the
model asserts faking behavior will influence a number of outcomes including validities,
test scores, scale reliabilities, and the factor structure. Although the model has not yet
been tested in its entirety, it does provide a framework from which researchers can
examine the expected effects of warnings on faking behavior.
Pace and Borman (2006) summarized five types of warnings that could be used to
reduce applicant faking. First is the detection warning, in which test takers are informed
that faked responses can be detected. Second is the consequence warning, which refers to
the test administrator explaining the penalty a respondent will receive for faking his or
her responses. Independently, these two warnings appear to have little effect on the
prevalence of faking. Combined, however, they have been shown to be effective at
reducing trait mean scores (Dwight & Donovan, 2003). In the Dwight and Donovan
study, the condition in which the detection warning was paired with the consequence
warning elicited lower mean scores (reduced faking) compared to the unwarned
condition, detection warning-only condition, and consequence-only condition. The
detection/consequence warning has had the most wide-spread use in the warning
literature.
The moral conviction warning appeals to the applicant’s sense of right and wrong.
Upon reading, it presumably brings to mind associations of honesty with appropriate
behavior and positive self-image, which may reduce faking levels as well.
Another approach to reducing faking, although not necessarily considered a
warning, is the for-research-only prompt. Essentially, the for-research-only prompt
explains why personality tests are used in selection, and how accurate responses aide in
8

improving the selection process. The administrator explains that a person’s responses will
not be tied to the person’s name or any other identifying information, nor will responses
affect the respondent in any way. Responses from this approach, since applicants will
have a decreased motivation to fake, are presumably closer to their true personality
scores.
Lastly, there is the reasoning warning, the “let’s reason together” approach (Pace,
Borman, Penney, Xu, & Bearden, 2005). This warning appeals to test-taker interests
rather than the consequences of faking. In a friendly tone, the warning points out that it
may not be in the test-taker’s best interest to fake his or her responses because dishonest
responses may result in the respondent being classified into jobs he or she is not best
suited for. It continues by pointing out that incorrect classification may result in
performance problems and a lack of job fit. The researchers developed this instruction
prompt for use in a military setting, where test takers will be classified into jobs based on
the test results. In the typical organizational selection context, the reasoning warning
would need to be rephrased to reflect conditions of being offered the job (or not) while
still maintaining the friendly, helpful tone.
The reasoning warning appeals to many levels of McFarland and Ryan’s (2000)
model of faking. The warning could affect beliefs toward faking in that it should increase
the belief that faking is not useful and faking will not help the applicant reach his or her
goals. Further, the warning may make the applicant realize that he or she does not fit the
job, based on the personality traits needed to be successful and satisfied in the job. Lastly,
with a decreased belief in the effectiveness of faking, there will be a decreased intention
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to fake. It is also possible, however, that such a warning could inform an applicant that it
is possible to fake responses, thereby leading to an increase in faking behavior.
Pace et al. (2005) conducted the only study I am aware of utilizing the reasoning
warning. Although the study was terminated before all data were collected, preliminary
results showed promise for the reasoning warning. Based on the available data, there
were no significant mean differences between personality scores on a number of
personality traits for the detection/consequence warning condition, reasoning warning
condition, and for-research-only condition. Due to the early termination of the Pace et al.
(2005) study, however, the researchers were unable to compare the means from the three
warning conditions with those of an unwarned group.
Procedural Justice
Procedural justice has been defined as the fairness of the procedures that are used
to determine organizational outcomes (Lind & Tyler, 1988). There is much evidence that
applicants tend to have negative perceptions of the use of personality measures in the
selection process because personality tests are not seen as directly relevant to the job
itself (Holtz, Ployhart, & Dominguez, 2005; Gilliland, 1993; Gilliland, 1994). The
content of a personality test is not closely related to the content of the job, and it is not
clear to most people what the relationship is between personality traits and job outcomes.
Gilliland (1993) attempted to integrate the literature on applicant perceived
procedural justice in the selection context by proposing a model of applicant reactions to
employment selections systems. While the model attempts to explain applicant reactions
to the entire selection process, I will focus only on the parts of the model relating to the
testing itself, where personality testing can best fit. Gilliland identifies four procedural
10

rules relating to the formal characteristics of the selection process – job relatedness,
opportunity to perform, reconsideration opportunity, and consistency. Job relatedness is
the extent to which the test itself appears to be related to the job content and could be a
valid predictor of job performance. The opportunity to perform refers to the applicant
having a say in the information used for the selection decision. The reconsideration
opportunity rule refers to the applicant’s opportunity to challenge the decision process.
Specifically, applicants need to be able to view their scores and understand the scoring
process. Finally, the consistency of administration rule refers to the need for applicants to
believe that all applicants were treated fairly and equally in the selection process. Other
rules relevant to the selection battery itself include honesty and the propriety of questions.
Honesty is the truthfulness the organization shows when communicating with applicants.
The propriety of questions refers to items being appropriate and not showing prejudice.
Combined, the above rules interact to influence the applicant’s overall opinion of the
organization’s selection process.
Gilliland tested certain components of his proposed model in a later study
(Gilliland, 1994). He found that perceived procedural justice was higher for applicants
whose selection procedures were viewed as most relevant to their job. He manipulated
the relevance of the testing procedure to the job by having groups of participants take
different tests (a work sample test, a cognitive ability test, or an overt integrity test). He
found that the work sample test was seen as most relevant to the future job, whereas the
integrity test was seen as the least relevant. Further, participants completing the work
sample test held the greatest perception of procedural justice, whereas those completing
the overt integrity test held the lowest.
11

Using a threat (in the form of a detection/consequence warning) in the application
process can negatively influence the applicant’s perception of the organization (Gilliland,
1993; McFarland, 2003). McFarland (2003) examined the direct effect of the
detection/consequence warning on applicant’s perception of procedural justice. She
outlined a number of ways warnings can negatively affect applicant perceptions of the
selection process. First, she pointed out that the detection warning could make applicants
feel that the organization is not allowing them to perform to as high a degree as possible.
Second, a detection warning informs applicants that the test can, indeed, be faked. As
such, applicants could believe that the measure would not accurately predict anything
about a future employee’s performance. Third, including items that assess dishonesty in
the personality test could be considered an unwarranted invasion of privacy.
McFarland hypothesized that a warning which explains that a measure of social
desirability is within the scale, and explains what the scale will be used for, will improve
applicant perceptions of the selection process. Although means on multiple components
of procedural justice for the warned group were lower, the differences were nonsignificant, suggesting that warnings had little effect on perceived procedural justice.
However, McFarland points out that the use of personality tests in selection is perceived
negatively overall, as seen in low mean scores on measures of procedural justice. Other
research has supported the notion that including a personality test in a selection battery
produces negative applicant reactions (Rosse et al., 1994; Steiner & Gilliland, 1996), and
Rees and Metcalfe (2003) found a quarter of participants thought personality
questionnaires could not effectively predict job performance, suggesting these personality
tests violate a number of procedural justice rules.
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As addressed above, Pace and Borman (2006) proposed the reasoning warning as
a more applicant-friendly approach to reducing faking. The use of the reasoning warning
could improve perceptions of procedural justice in the use of personality tests for
selection by explaining to respondents that honest answers do, in fact, make personality
measurement effective and honest answers are in their own best interests. The
detection/consequence warning could have shown no effect on perceived procedural
justice in McFarland’s (2003) study because it did not directly address any of Gilliland’s
(1993) procedural justice rules. Logically, explaining the reasons behind including the
personality test in the selection battery, and honesty from the organization can improve
applicant perceptions of procedural justice through Gilliland’s job relatedness and
honesty rules (as discussed above). Related to the McFarland and Ryan (2000) model, the
reasoning warning could also reduce the intention to fake due to a desire to reciprocate
with honesty and fairness to the organization. In sum, the reasoning warning could
potentially improve applicant perceptions of procedural justice through addressing
several procedural justice rules.
Identifying Faking
Several methods for detecting faking and dealing with its effects have been
proposed in the research. Below, I will briefly summarize three approaches – selfpresentation or direct evidence, mean comparisons, and variance comparisons.
Self-Presentation/Direct Evidence
Some personality measures have items built into them meant to identify fakers.
Using one or more of these methods, statistical correction can be made to obtain an
adjusted score for applicants (Ellingson et al., 1999). However, these statistical
13

corrections have not shown improved validity (Barrick & Mount, 1996; Mueller-Hanson
et al., 2003). Alternatively, researchers have attempted to identify faking and honest
groups based on a median split on impression management scales. Stark, Chernyshenko,
Chan, Lee and Drasgow (2001) examined the psychometric properties of a number of
personality scales using IRT differential item functioning (DIF) analysis, with honest and
faking groups determined through such a median split. They found that fewer items
showed DIF using the median split on an impression management measure compared to
data from applicant and non-applicant samples. They concluded that due to DIF and
differential test functioning, the scale might measure different underlying constructs for
applicant and non-applicant samples. As such, this median split should not be applied to
the analysis and interpretation of personality data.
Rosse et al. (1998) controlled for response distortion using an impression
management scale. They found that the rank order of applicants was very different
between controlled and uncontrolled applicant personality scores, especially at the top of
the distribution, where employment decisions at smaller selection ratios will be made.
While controlling for social desirability has been used in an attempt to decrease the
effects of faking on selection, researchers are not entirely clear if controlling for social
desirability or impression management actually reflects the individual’s true personality.
Ellingson et al. (1999) compared honest and corrected applicant scores in a
within-subjects study. They had participants take a personality test twice, once under an
honest condition, and once under a “fake good” condition, then obtained corrected scores
by correcting the “fake good” scores for intentional distortion using a social desirability
scale. Although correcting for distortion did bring group mean scores for the faking group
14

down to the level of honest condition means, the correlations between honest and
corrected scores were low (r = .09-.26). To assess the effect of correcting scores on
selection, Ellingson et al. created a series of selection scenarios based on mock-applicant
personality test scores then examined which participants would be selected using a topdown selection procedure using each person’s true and corrected scores. The authors
considered a correct selection decision to have occurred when applicants who were
selected based on their honest scores were also selected with their corrected scores. In
some scenarios, social desirability corrections improved the proportion of applicants
correctly selected. In other scenarios, corrections had no effect or reduced the proportion
correctly selected. Consequently, it is possible that applicant rankings based on corrected
personality scores may not result in true-score rankings. Thus, a social desirability
measure may not be the most effective method for identifying or controlling for applicant
faking behaviors.
Some researchers maintain that social desirability may reflect valid personalityrelated variances (Ellingson et al., 1999; Ones et al., 1996) and should not be used to
correct personality scores. Furthermore, there is a body of research that has looked at the
effectiveness of adding a frame of reference to the personality measure. For example,
Schmit, Ryan, Stierwalt, and Powell (1995) added a school context to each item on a
Conscientiousness scale. They found increased validity for all Conscientiousness
subscales using a school frame of reference in predicting performance relative to college
GPA, as compared to the scale with no frame of reference. Hunthausen, Truxillo, Bauer,
and Hammer (2003) found similar results using a work-place sample and job
performance criterion. Both studies’ results suggest that socially desirable responding can
15

reflect true work performance, assuming the applicant does exhibit the reported behaviors
at work, even though his or her personality-based behaviors outside the work context may
be notably different.
Mean Comparisons
The most common method for identifying faking is the mean comparison method
using a between-subjects design (see Birkeland, Manson, Kisamore, Brannick, & Smith,
2006 meta-analysis) (Barrick & Mount, 1996; Dwight & Donovan, 2003; McFarland,
2003; McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Rosse et al., 1998). As addressed above, considerable
research has found a statistical increase in average scores for faking groups (Barrick &
Mount, 1996; Hough, 1998). Researchers have used a number of methods to identify or
create the faking group used in these mean comparisons. In some studies using nonapplicant samples, participants have been given a reward for “getting” the job (financial
incentives). Others have instructed participants to intentionally distort their responses so
they get the job. In one study, McFarland (2003) simply asked if applicants lied on the
test to increase their scores.
For applicant samples, some researchers have presumed that applicants are
motivated to fake their responses to make the best impression they can, whereas an
incumbent sample should show much less faking behavior (Rosse et al., 1998). Hogan,
Barrett, and Hogan (2007) took a different approach. Applicants completed a personality
test during an initial employment process. The majority of applicants were not offered
jobs. Six months later, many of those who did not previously receive a job offer reapplied
to the same organization. Hogan et al. suggested that these re-applicants would be more
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highly motivated to get the job the second time around, although they did not find support
for this supposition.
Regardless of the method used to induce or discourage faking, the analyses are
simple – compare group means on individual personality traits between the faking and
non-faking groups and examine the effect sizes to evaluate differences.
Variance
For some of the most popular personality tests, such as the NEO-PI-R and NEOFFI (Costa & McCrae, 1992) participants respond to the personality measure using a fivepoint Likert scale according to how much they agree the items describe them. Assuming
applicants want the job, responses may be positively distorted, and moving responses
toward the “five” mark will reduce the response variance, so faking groups should be
expected to show less variance than an honest group.
Also, some researchers have found that applicants distort their responses to a
different extent on different personality variables (McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Rosse et al.,
1998). These findings suggest that applicants view certain personality traits as more
relevant to the job than others, demonstrating another source of variance in faking
conditions. Identifying a faking group based on different variances, however, would be
difficult to argue. Furthermore, comparing variance would do little to help identify
individual fakers. The value in comparing variance between conditions would be to
suggest there are different treatment effects between groups.
Summary
Presumably, when applicants are within the selection context, they will want to
present the most favorable impression of themselves. While the composition of the Big
17

Five personality traits vary depending on the measure, all seek to assess five similar,
recognizable traits. When distorting responses, the applicant who is trying to appear more
favorable than other applicants would likely respond more highly on items related to
Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness, and less high on items
related to Neuroticism.
In sum, although evidence suggests that faking on a personality test does not
seriously affect criterion-related validities for a number of important organizational
outcomes, faking does affect the rank-order of job candidates, especially near the top of
the score distribution. Furthermore, the inclusion of a personality measure in the selection
process can negatively influence perceptions of the selection process, and perhaps the
organization. As such, I will test the effect of the reasoning warning in reducing the
prevalence of faking and the perception of procedural justice. If the reasoning warning
can be shown to be as effective as the detection/consequence warning at reducing
applicant faking on a personality measure, and if the reasoning warning shows improved
perceptions of procedural justice, then the reasoning warning could be argued to be the
better warning prompt to use. I hypothesize that:
H1: A personality test with no warning will show higher mean scores for
Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness than the for-researchonly (control) condition, the detection/consequence warning, and the reasoning warning,
and lower mean scores for Neuroticism.
H2: A personality test with the detection/consequence warning or the reasoning
warning will show no difference in mean scores from the for-research-only condition for
any personality variables.
18

H3: The perception of procedural justice in the reasoning warning condition will
be higher than with the detection/consequence warning condition.

19

Chapter Two
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited from two sources. The first sample (Nursing sample)
came from nurses working in the medical field in Louisville, Ky. The other source was
undergraduate students in psychology courses at a southeastern United States public
university (Student sample). I obtained responses from 267 nursing participants (89.5%
female, 9% male, 1.5% missing). Ages ranged from 18 to 58 (M = 25.63; SD = 6.51). The
majority of the nursing participants were White/Caucasian (82.8%), with 13.5%
Black/African American, .7% Asian/Pacific Islander, .4% Native American, and 2.6%
Other/Mixed Race.
I obtained 155 responses from the Student sample. Two responses showed
uniform responding throughout, and two more responses were completed in around one
minute (96 items), which was two minutes shorter than the next response time, so 151
responses were included in the analyses (79.5% female, 20.5% male). Ages ranged from
18 to 42 (M = 21.75, SD = 3.64). The majority of Student participants were
White/Caucasian (49.7%), with 19.9% Black/African American, 17.2% Hispanic/Latino,
7.3% Asian/Pacific Islander, and 6% Other/Mixed Race. This sample was employed in a
number of industries including the medical industry (30.5%), retail/service industry
(17.9%), and professional industries (15.2%), among others, with 25.2% unemployed.
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As I have no expectations for differences between groups based on gender, race,
tenure, employment status, etc., there were no exclusionary criteria for participants in
either sample. I collected no identifying information above basic demographics from
participants. No compensation was given to participants, and participation was
completely voluntary for both samples.
Measures
Warning Prompts: Participants received one of four instruction prompts. In order
to create a control condition with honest responses, the for-research-only condition
(Honest condition) differed from the other conditions. Participants in the for-researchonly condition were presented with only the following paragraph preceding the
personality test:
For-research-only condition (Honest condition):
You are about to take a personality test. As you answer the following questions,
please be as honest as you can. Your responses will be used for research purposes
only. There will be no identifying information kept with your responses, and all
responses will be kept strictly confidential. Honest answers will help us to get an
idea of the typical person’s true personality.
Participants in the other three conditions (no warning, detection/consequence
warning, and reasoning warning) were told to pretend they are a job applicant trying to
get a job in the field of nursing. They were also told the personality test they were about
to take would be a key part of the job selection process. This general instruction prompt
was included in the remaining three forms:
General instruction prompt:
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Pretend you are a job applicant trying to get your ideal job in the field of nursing.
The personality test you are about to take is a very important part of the job
selection process, so it is important that you do well. Please respond to the test as
you would if you were applying for this job. The test will be used in the decision to
hire all job candidates.
The Detection/Consequence and Reasoning warnings then followed the general
instruction prompt with their respective warnings:
Detection/Consequence warning:
Please be aware of the following two points:
1. This test contains questions designed to identify those who slant their
responses to make themselves look like a better candidate than they are.
Research has shown that these questions are an effective way of identifying
individuals who provide inaccurate information about themselves.
2. Dishonest or distorted self-descriptions will invalidate your results. In other
words, faking will result in your not being considered for the job.
Reasoning warning:
This test has been designed to find job candidates who will be most successful and
happy in this job. Please respond honestly to the following questions. Those who
respond dishonestly may find themselves in jobs they are not well suited for,
which may in turn result in poor performance and dissatisfaction with the job, so
it is in your own best interest to answer the following questions honestly.
Personality Test: I used the International Personality Item Pool (IPIP) (Goldberg
et al., 2006; Appendix A) as my personality assessment tool. The IPIP has 10 items for
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each Big Five trait (50 items total); Neuroticism (α = .84) (“Often feel blue”),
Extraversion (α = .84) (“Feel comfortable around people”), Openness to Experience (α =
.62) (“Have a vivid imagination”), Agreeableness (α = .75) (“Have a good word for
everyone”), and Conscientiousness (α = .84) (“Am always prepared”). The IPIP items
included in assessment of the Big Five traits were selected based on rank-ordered
correlations with scores on the NEO PI-R. The items showing the highest correlations
with each trait were selected to be included in the measure. The developers performed a
visual content analysis to identify items that addressed the same issue. If they found two
items that were too similar in content, they removed the item with the lower correlation,
and the next item in the rank-order was included. Responses are on a five-point Likerttype scale, with anchors of 1 = Very Inaccurate, 3 = Neither Inaccurate nor Accurate, and
5 = Very Accurate.
Procedural Justice: I used a modified version of Colquitt’s (2001) Procedural
Justice Questionnaire (PJQ; Appendix B). Colquitt created the items based on
Leventhal’s (1980) procedural justice rules. The phrasing of some of the original items
referred to a present outcome rather than the current selection process, so I made tense
and small phrasing changes to make the items fit the current study’s testing situation. A
sample item includes “Have you had an influence over the outcome arrived at by these
procedures?” The measure is a seven-item scale with a five-point Likert-type response
with anchors 1 = to a small extent, and 5 = to a large extent. Internal consistency
reliability is high, α = .83.
I also used certain subscales of Bauer et al.’s (2001) Selection Procedural Justice
Scale (SPJS; Appendix C). Since the focus of this study is on the applicant perception of
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procedural justice regarding the use of a personality test in the selection process and the
use of various warnings, I am only including the subscales relating to the test itself. The
included subscales are job-relatedness – predictive (“A person who scored well on this
test will be a good nurse,” α = .83), chance to perform (“I was able to show what I can do
on this test,” α = .91), propriety of questions (“The test itself did not seem too personal or
private,” α = .78), and job-relatedness content (“The content of the test was clearly
related to the nursing job,” α = .93). The included subscales have 11 items total, with a
high reliability of α = 84.
Impression Management: I have also included the Impression Management (IM)
subscale of Paulhus’s Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) (Paulhus,
1991; Appendix D). Paulhus defines impression management as intentionally changing
behavior for an audience. While much research has shown that accounting for variance in
responding to personality tests in the selection context based on social desirability does
not bring individual scores do the “honest” level, social desirability scales are still often
used in personality research. The measure is a 20 item scale with a seven-point Likerttype response with anchors 1 = Not True, 4 = Somewhat True, and 7 = Very True.
Reliability for the IM scale was found to be moderate, α = .77.
Procedure
I collected data from the Nursing sample in a series of testing sessions during two
typical work days. Testing sessions ranged from early morning to late evening to cover
multiple work shifts, with 13 to 56 participants in each session, for a total of eight
sessions. The testing session involved a short introduction by the experimenter explaining
that participation was entirely voluntary and no adverse outcome would result from them
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deciding not to participate. Participants then read and signed the informed consent form,
which was collected before distributing the surveys. After all consent forms had been
collected, participants were given the experiment’s survey face down, instructed to read
the survey instructions, and completed the measure. Once all participants had finished,
the experimenter debriefed participants as to the purpose of the study, including a brief
summary of previous research on warnings and revelation of the different warning
prompts presented. Any remaining questions were also answered. Before ending the
debriefing session, the experimenter asked participants not to discuss the study with any
of their coworkers, so as not to compromise the manipulation.
The Student sample completed the survey through the online data-collection
SONA system. This system required participant to sign into the website, then select the
study to participate in. They were asked to select “ok” to indicate their consent to
participate. They were then directed to a digital version of the survey to complete. Due to
restraints on the SONA system, data had to be collected from one condition at a time. The
order of conditions collected was Reasoning Warning, Detection/Consequence Warning,
Faking, then Honest.
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Chapter Three
Results
Many of the analyses below required supplementary tests to an omnibus statistic
(ANOVA). In these cases, I used the Bonferroni procedure to control for Type I error. In
the Bonferroni procedure, the alpha level (often .05) is divided by the number of post hoc
analyses performed. For example, if five post hoc analyses are performed to an ANOVA,
an alpha level of .01 would be used to test the post hoc tests for significance. Also,
interpreting effect sizes, I used Cohen’s (1988) conventions of d = .2 as a small effect, d
= .5 as a medium effect, and d = .8 as a large effect (Cohen, 1988).
Comparison of Sources
The first step in my data analyses was to examine participant responses for
differences between the Nursing and Student samples using the multivariate MANOVA
test with Source (Student or Nurse) and Survey (Reasoning, Detection/Consequence,
Faking, Honest) as the independent variables, and all personality, justice, and impression
management variables as the dependent variables. The MANOVA for Survey was
significant, Wilk’s Λ = .86, F(36, 1158.94) = 1.74, p = .005. Follow-up ANOVAs
suggested that differences could be found only for Neuroticism and Impression
Management (Table 1). All other variables had low power (below .55), suggesting
significant results may not have been detected.
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Table 1
Follow-up ANOVAs to Survey MANOVA: Full sample
MS
F
p
power
Neuroticism
1.8
3.86
.010
.82
Extraversion
.98
2.12
.097
.54
Openness
.30
1.19
.314
.32
Agreeableness
.55
2.02
.111
.52
Conscientiousness
.17
.42
.736
.14
PJQ
.06
.11
.957
.07
SPJS
.47
1.19
.314
.32
JR – Predict
1.88
2.15
.093
.55
Perform
.16
.20
.895
.09
Propriety
1.29
1.84
.139
.48
JR – Content
2.38
2.27
.080
.57
Impression Mgmt
2.34
3.74
.011
.81
* Alpha level = .05; results are for F(3, X), where X varies depending on sample size due to missing data.

Table 2
Follow-up ANOVAs to Source MANOVA: Full sample
MS
F
p
power
Neuroticism
1.72
3.68
.056
.48
Extraversion
.98
2.13
.145
.31
Openness
.77
3.05
.081
.41
Agreeableness
8.08
29.79
.000
.99
Conscientiousness
9.61
24.62
.000
.99
PJQ
.73
1.26
.263
.20
SPJS
.01
.01
.915
.05
JR – Predict
4.05
4.64
.032
.58
Perform
1.71
2.23
.136
.32
Propriety
3.83
5.45
.020
.64
JR – Content
4.13
3.94
.048
.51
Impression Mgmt
5.34
8.52
.004
.83
* Alpha level = .05; results are for F(3, X), where X varies depending on sample size due to missing data.

27

The MANOVA for Source was also significant, Wilk’s Λ = .84, F(12, 392) =
6.25, p = .000. Follow-up ANOVAs suggested that differences could be found for
Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Job Relatedness – Predictive, Propriety, Job
Relatedness – Content, and Impression Management. As with the Survey follow-ups, all
non-significant variables had low power of .48 or below (Table 2).
There was no significant multivariate interaction between Survey and Source,
Wilk’s Λ = .912, F(36, 1158.94) = 1.019, p = .439, power = .93.
Since the Source analyses showed that there were several differences between
variables due to the sample but the interaction was not significant, I decided to analyze
Students and Nurses separately. M and SD for all variables by condition can be found in
Tables 3 and 4, and bivariate correlations among variables by Source can be found in
Tables 5 and 6).
Personality
I had two hypotheses regarding the personality measures. I first hypothesized that
responses from the Faking condition would show higher mean scores for Extraversion,
Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness than the Honest, Faking, and
Reasoning conditions, and lower mean scores for Neuroticism. I also hypothesized that
the Honest condition would show no difference in mean scores from the Reasoning
warning condition nor the Detection/Consequence condition. While there is a fair amount
of support suggesting that the Detection/Consequence warning elicits responses that are
consistently less socially desirable than the Faking condition, the remaining hypotheses
are less clearly summarized.
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Table 3
Means and standard deviations for Nurse and Student samples for the IPIP
Nurse
Student
Variable by Condition
M
SD
M
SD
Reasoning
N = 65
N = 38
Neuroticism
2.32
.73
2.66
.72
Extraversion
3.61
.68
3.47
.80
Openness
3.48
.50
3.66
.40
Agreeableness
3.92
.54
3.60
.53
Conscientiousness
3.96
.64
3.58
.61
Detection/Consequence
N = 67
N = 37
Neuroticism
2.49
.63
2.61
.61
Extraversion
3.47
.68
3.42
.68
Openness
3.35
.49
3.50
.48
Agreeableness
3.83
.54
3.61
.53
Conscientiousness
3.83
.54
3.61
.53
Faking
N = 69
N = 38
Neuroticism
2.12
.64
2.50
.68
Extraversion
3.83
.62
3.49
.67
Openness
3.49
.52
3.56
.44
Agreeableness
4.07
.49
3.69
.49
Conscientiousness
4.13
.63
3.49
.69
Honest
N = 66
N = 38
Neuroticism
2.77
.73
2.48
.69
Extraversion
3.57
.65
3.72
.68
Openness
3.53
.52
3.50
.60
Agreeableness
3.87
.54
3.61
.50
Conscientiousness
3.74
.66
3.71
.67
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Table 4
Means and standard deviations for Nurse and Student Samples for procedural justice
Nurse
Student
Variable by Condition
M
SD
M
SD
Reasoning
N = 64
N = 38
PJQ
3.63
.84
3.63
.73
SPJS
2.66
.69
2.59
.65
Job Relatedness – Pred
2.27
1.00
2.51
.86
Perform
2.13
.92
2.22
.86
Propriety
3.88
.90
3.48
.79
Job Relatedness –
Content
2.29
.99
2.09
1.06
Detection/Consequence
N = 66
N = 37
PJQ
3.65
.75
3.51
.73
SPJS
2.60
.70
2.52
.63
Job Relatedness – Pred
2.25
.97
2.36
.95
Perform
2.18
.86
2.23
.84
Propriety
3.67
.95
3.51
.83
Job Relatedness –
Content
2.16
.98
1.77
.82
Faking
N = 68
N = 38
PJQ
3.66
.88
3.53
.55
SPJS
2.70
.56
2.77
.52
Job Relatedness – Pred
2.46
.87
2.72
.93
Perform
2.17
.80
2.36
.77
Propriety
3.85
.82
3.61
.76
Job Relatedness –
Content
2.30
1.08
2.39
1.27
Honest
N = 65
N = 38
PJQ
3.62
.80
3.53
.61
SPJS
2.65
.66
2.72
.59
Job Relatedness – Pred
2.19
.92
2.39
.98
Perform
2.16
.97
2.36
.95
Propriety
3.86
.87
3.92
.69
Job Relatedness Content
2.28
.94
1.95
1.06
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Table 5
Intercorrelations among study variables: Nurse sample
1
2
3
4
1. Neuroticism
-2. Extraversion
-.42
-3. Openness
-.12
.15
-4. Agreeableness
-.43
.15
.31
-5. Conscientiousness
-.52
.17
.22
.47
6. PJQ
-.13
.03
.07
.22
7. SPJS
-.09
-.01
.06
.14
8. JR – Predict
-.11
.01
.16
.13
9. Perform
-.05
-.01
.02
.11
10. Propriety
-.09
.07
.08
.10
11. JR – Content
-.01
-.12
-.08
.04
12. Impression
Mgmt
-.22
-.05
.05
.38

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

-.15
.11
.09
.06
.13
.05

-.39
.19
.25
.45
.18

-.67
.85
.58
.64

-.57
.19
.29

-.22
.44

-.18

--

.42

.10

.14

.16

.12

.04

.07

* Correlations at magnitude .12 and above are significant at the .05 level.
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Table 6
Intercorrelations among study variables: Student sample
1
2
3
4
1. Neuroticism
-2. Extraversion
-.43
-3. Openness
-.17
.15
-4. Agreeableness
-.33
.17
.24
-5. Conscientiousness
-.46
.32
.21
.29
6. PJQ
-.20
.17
-.01
.27
7. SPJS
-.15
.02
-.03
.06
8. JR – Predict
-.08
-.01
.05
.03
9. Perform
-.02
.02
-.02
-.01
10. Propriety
-.25
.14
.05
.19
11. JR – Content
-.08
-.11
-.15
-.02
12. Impression
Mgmt
-.24
-.02
.17
.48

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

-.31
.03
-.03
.02
.22
-.14

-.07
.00
-.07
.37
-.09

-.69
.87
.43
.62

-.58
.07
.27

-.13
.45

--.03

--

.18

.06

.07

.09

.04

-.03

.09

* Correlations at magnitude .17 and above are significant at the .05 level.
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To test my personality hypotheses, I performed a series of one-way ANOVAs
with the survey form as the independent variable and the mean score for each of the five
personality variables as the dependent variables. For the Nursing sample, one-way
ANOVAs showed significant differences between condition means for Neuroticism, F(3,
1) = 11.09, p = .000, power = .999, Extraversion, F(3, 1) = 3.81, p = .011, power = .814,
Agreeableness, F(3, 1) = 2.69, p = .047, power = .650 and Conscientiousness, F(3, 1) =
4.95, p = .002, power = .910, but not for Openness, F(3, 1) = 1.51, p = .212, power = .397
(Table 5). I then followed each significant ANOVA with Tukey’s post-hoc tests based on
my five planned comparisons. In order to control for Type 1 error, I used the Bonferroni
procedure to set .01 as my significance criterion for each Tukey’s post-hoc test. A
summary of all one-way ANOVAs and Tukey’s post-hoc tests can be found in Table 7.
For Neuroticism, the mean for the Reasoning condition (M = 2.32, SD = .73) was
significantly lower than the Honest condition (M = 2.77, SD = .73), p = .001, with a
moderate effect size, d = -.62, and the Faking condition (M = 2.12, SD = .64) was
significantly lower than the Honest condition, p = .008, d = .58. The Faking condition
was also lower for the Detection/Consequence condition (M = 2.49, SD = .63), p = .000,
d = .73.
For Extraversion, the Detection/Consequence condition (M = 3.47, SD = .68) was
significantly lower than the Faking condition (M = 3.83, SD = .62), p = .007, with a
moderate effect size, d = .55. For Conscientiousness, the Faking condition (M = 4.13, SD
= .63) was significantly greater than the Honest condition (M = 3.74, SD = .66), p = .002,
d = .60. The comparison between the Detection/Consequence (M = 3.83, SD = .54) and
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Faking conditions for Conscientiousness, p = .026, d = -.51, was excluded from
interpretation because significance did not reach the .01 alpha level.
The comparison between the Detection/Consequence (M = 3.83, SD = .54) and
Faking (M = 4.07, SD = .49) conditions for Agreeableness, p = .042, d = -.47, was
likewise excluded from interpretation.
I tested my second hypothesis, which hypothesized no differences between
groups, by examining the effect sizes between the warned conditions and the Honest
condition. For the Reasoning-Honest difference, Extraversion had a small effect size, d =
.09. For Conscientiousness, however, the effect size was slightly larger, d = .34, and for
Neuroticism, there was a significant difference between means, with a large effect size, d
= .62. For the Detection/Consequence-Honest difference, Neuroticism had a moderate
effect size, d = .41, but Extraversion and Conscientiousness had quite small effect sizes, d
= .15 and d = .15. Overall, this hypothesis was supported for the Detection/ConsequenceHonest comparison, but there was not much support for the Reasoning-Honest
comparison. Although effect sizes of magnitude .41 and .34 are large enough to be
considered meaningful, the means did not differ significantly, so the differences could
have been due to error.
For the Student sample, a one-way ANOVA showed no significant difference
between condition means for Neuroticism, F(3,1) = .61, p = .612, power = .174,
Extraversion, F(3,1) = 1.36, p = .256, power = .357, Openness, F(3,1) = .88, p = .452,
power = .239, Agreeableness, F(3,1) = .23, p = .879, power = .092, nor
Conscientiousness, F(3,1) = .78, p = .509, power = .214. As none of the one-way
ANOVAs was significant, no post-hoc tests were performed.
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Table 7
Descriptive and ANOVA statistics with Tukey’s post hoc tests for the personality
variables: Nurse Sample
Variable by Condition
Neuroticism

F(3, 1)*
11.09

p
.000

Tukey’s
PHST*

N

M

SD

Reasoning

65

2.32a

.73

a = .001

Detection/Consequence

67

2.49b

Faking
Honest
Extraversion
Reasoning

69
3.81

1.51

2.69

c = .000

.73

66

2.77

65

3.61

.68

67

3.47a

.68

69
66

a

3.83
3.57

.62
.65

65
67
69
66

3.48
3.35
3.49
3.53

.50
.49
.52
.52

ns

65

3.91

.54

a = .042 (ns)

a = .007

.047
67

4.95

.64

ac

.212

Detection/Consequence
Faking
Honest
Conscientiousness
Reasoning

b = .008

.011

Detection/Consequence
Faking
Honest
Openness
Reasoning
Detection/Consequence
Faking
Honest
Agreeableness
Reasoning

2.12

.63

bc

3.83

a

.54

a

69
66

4.07
3.87

.49
.54

65

3.96

.64

a = .026 (ns)

67

3.83a

.54

b = .002

.002

Detection/Consequence
Faking

69

Honest

66

4.13

ab

.63

b

.66

3.74

* Significance for the one-way ANOVAs are at the .05 alpha level. Significance for the Tukey’s post-hoc
test is at the .01 alpha level.
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Procedural Justice
I hypothesized that participant perceptions of procedural justice within this study
would be greater for participants in the Reasoning condition than the
Detection/Consequence condition. This hypothesis was not supported.
I conducted independent samples t-tests to examine responses for differences
between participant perceptions of procedural justice based on mean scores on Colquitt’s
(2001) PJQ and Bauer et al.’s (2001) overall SPJS, as well as the individual subscales
included in the SPJS (Job Relatedness – Predictive, Chance to Perform, Propriety of
Questions, and Job Relatedness – Content). For Nurses, the mean perception of
procedural justice did not differ between the Reasoning and Detection/Consequence
conditions for any of the justice measures or subscales (M, SD and t-test statistics can be
found in Table 8). Similarly, no differences between means were found for Students
either (see Table 9). Contrary to my hypothesis, the mean perception of procedural justice
did not differ between the Reasoning and Detection/Consequence conditions for any of
the justice measures or subscales for neither Nurses nor Students.
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Table 8
Descriptive and t-test statistics for the procedural justice variables: Nurse sample
Variable by Condition
t*
df
p
N
M
SD
Colquitt’s PJQ
-.15
128
.879
Reasoning
64
3.63
.84
Detection/Consequence
66
3.65
.75
Bauer et al.’s SPJP
.51
129
.614
Reasoning
64
2.66
.69
Detection/Consequence
67
2.60
.70
Job-Relatedness Predictive
.11
129
.911
Reasoning
64
2.27
1.00
Detection/Consequence
67
2.25
.97
Perform
-.37
129
.711
Reasoning
64
2.13
.92
Detection/Consequence
67
2.18
.86
Propriety
1.29
129
.201
Reasoning
64
3.88
.90
Detection/Consequence
67
3.67
.95
Job-Relatedness Content
.72
129
.470
Reasoning
64
2.29
.99
Detection/Consequence
67
2.16
.98
* Significance for the independent samples t-tests are at the .05 alpha level.
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Table 9
Descriptive and t-test statistics for the procedural justice variables: Student sample
Variable by Condition
t*
df
p
N
M
SD
Colquitt’s PJQ
.71
73
.483
Reasoning
38
3.63
.73
Detection/Consequence
37
3.51
.73
Bauer et al’s SPJP
.49
73
.626
Reasoning
38
2.59
.65
Detection/Consequence
37
2.52
.63
Job-Relatedness Predictive
.71
73
.481
Reasoning
38
2.51
.86
Detection/Consequence
37
2.36
.95
Perform
-.06
73
.949
Reasoning
38
2.22
.86
Detection/Consequence
37
2.23
.84
Propriety
-.17
73
.869
Reasoning
38
3.48
.79
Detection/Consequence
37
3.51
.83
Job-Relatedness Content
1.47
73
.146
Reasoning
38
2.09
1.06
Detection/Consequence
37
1.77
.82
* Significance for the independent samples t-tests are at the .05 alpha level.

Impression Management
Using an ANOVA, I also found no significant mean differences for the
Impression Management scale for either the Nursing sample, F(3, 1) = 2.33, p = .075, nor
the Student sample, F(3, 1) = 1.81, p = .148.
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Chapter Four
Discussion
Personality
I hypothesized that responses from the Faking condition would show higher mean
scores for Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness than the
Honest, Detection/Consequence, and Reasoning conditions, and lower mean scores for
Neuroticism. I also hypothesized that the Honest condition would show no difference in
mean scores from the Reasoning warning condition nor the Detection/Consequence
condition. Since the ANOVAs for the student sample showed no differences between any
means, the following discussion will refer to the Nursing sample results, unless otherwise
specified.
My first hypothesis was partially for the Faking and Detection/Consequence
comparison. The Faking condition elicited higher mean scores than the
Detection/Consequence warning for Extraversion, and lower mean scores for
Neuroticism. Also, there is some support for the Faking and Honest comparison. The
Faking condition elicited higher mean scores than the Honest condition for
Conscientiousness, and lower for Neuroticism. The second part of my hypotheses (that
the Honest condition would show no significant difference in mean scores from the
warned conditions) was supported for all but the Reasoning warning condition in
Neuroticism, which was significantly higher than the honest mean. Examination of effect
sizes revealed mostly small or negligible effects for both warnings, although the
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Detection/Consequence-Honest difference approached a moderate effect size even though
this difference was not statistically significant.
Consistent with previous research, these results suggest that the
Detection/Consequence warning is an effective method for reducing applicant mean
scores on a personality test within the job selection context because means were
frequently lower than the Faking condition and did not differ from the Honest condition.
The Reasoning warning, however, appears to be less effective. In fact, for Neuroticism,
there is a significant difference between the Reasoning warning condition and the Honest
condition, but no difference between the Reasoning condition and the Faking condition.
Evidence thus suggests that a warning that the test administrators can identify those who
distort their responses and threatening them with removing the applicants from the
selection process if they do fake their responses is needed to significantly reduce
applicant scores.
Dwight and Donovan (2003) pointed out that there are other possible reasons
mean scores are decreased in warned conditions compared to faking conditions. One
reason they mentioned was that respondents could overcompensate in their responses so
as to avoid being identified as a faker. My results do not support this alternative
explanation for the effect of warnings on personality scores. Since I included both faking
and honest conditions in my study, I was able to show that a detection/consequence
warning prompt does result in mean scores significantly lower than faked scores, and also
that these lower scores did not differ from honest scores.
Unfortunately, the more applicant friendly warning was not as effective at
reducing applicant faking behavior as a detection/consequence warning in this study’s
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context. It is possible that utilizing a reasoning warning in the selection context actually
undermined the attempt to decrease applicant faking. The warning indirectly informs
respondents that they have a choice when responding to be honest or distort their
responses. This could have made participants who had not considered distorting their
responses aware that they could, resulting in an increase in faking behavior for some
respondents. Rees and Metcalfe (2003) found that a significant proportion of respondents
said they had no problem faking during the application process, so informing applicants
they have the opportunity to fake could result in increased faking behavior.
It is important to note that Pace et al. (2006) originally created this warning for
use in a classification context in which applicants know they have a job, unlike this
selection context. In that context, this warning may be more convincing to applicants.
Accordingly, the reasoning warning might be used as a second-tier tool where
organizations use the personality test’s results to place the applicant in a best-fit job.
Procedural Justice
I hypothesized that applicants in the Reasoning condition would perceive greater
procedural justice than participants in the Detection/Consequence condition because of
the more applicant-friendly tone of the Reasoning warning. My study shows no evidence
of differences in perceptions of procedural justice between warning conditions. Perhaps
the experimental manipulation did not replicate the selection context sufficiently to have
participants form opinions about the fairness of the selection procedures.
Similarly, applicants may not form attitudes about the selection process until after
the decision to hire is made. I modified my procedural justice measures to focus on the
selection process such that no knowledge of the outcome was necessary to respond to the
41

measures. If applicants do not form a strong opinion about the procedures used when
applying for a job until the outcome is known, this study’s procedural justice measure
could have missed the variance that would have been affected by utilizing different
warnings.
A final possibility is that despite McFarland’s (2003) findings, warnings on
personality tests do not have any effect on applicant attitudes within the selection context.
Rather, merely including a personality test in the selection battery could harm perceptions
of procedural justice. I re-examined this study’s data to look for differences between any
of the four conditions examined, but found no differences between conditions for any of
the procedural justice variables. Like McFarland’s findings, participants in this study did
report low perceptions of procedural justice (based on variable means, see Table 2), but
of course, this is merely an observation, and more intensive research on applicant
perceptions of personality tests should be performed.
Impression Management
I found no differences in self-reported impression management between the
study’s four conditions. This could be because the measure was not affected by the
instruction prompts, which was to be expected. Participants were informed that the test
for selection ended after they completed the personality test. As such, applicants likely
did not respond to the impression management measure in a job selection mindset. It is
also possible that impression management is more stable than some other personality
traits so that a person who is prone to impression management would be unaffected by
different testing contexts. I want to note that my Nursing sample demonstrated quite a bit
of resistance to answering this part of the survey. Some wrote comments on their
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response surveys and the experimenter overheard several respondents say they thought
the items were too invasive and inappropriate. Many left items throughout the scale
blank. From a methodological standpoint, the testing site could have been an issue. Since
Nurse participants took the survey in their place of work, self monitoring could have
affected responses such that those who completed the measure responded favorably,
rather than honestly.
Limitations
The main limitation of this study is the limited generalizeability of results due to
the context of the test administration. As already mentioned, since the surveys in this
study were not part of a true selection process, participant’s responses may not reflect
those that would be obtained in a high-stakes selection setting. However, the several
significant mean differences between the Honest and Faking conditions of this study do
show a difference in responses consistent with what previous research has shown
between honest and faked responses, suggesting the results do simulate a real applicant
setting, to an extent.
Another limitation relates to my Nursing sample. It is possible that the study’s
warning prompts could have different effects on non-nursing samples, such as those
working in finance, marketing, or government, for example. The lack of significant
results within the Student sample could have been due to industry-specific impacts of the
warnings. Since the student sample was composed of participants working in a variety of
fields as well as some unemployed participants, there could have been too much noise to
pick up on the effects of the warning prompts. I reanalyzed the student sample responses
by respondents’ industry of employment (for those who were employed), but found no
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significant mean comparisons. However, the small sample size of each condition within
each industry (N < 11) limited the possibility of finding significant differences. Thus, this
study’s results should be cautiously interpreted and applied outside the selection context
for nurses.
Statistical power was also a concern in this study. Post hoc power tests showed
Neuroticism, Extraversion, and Conscientiousness had sufficient power to detect
significant differences (power > .80), but Openness to Experience and Agreeableness had
low power for the nursing sample. Power was very low for all personality variables in the
student sample, leaving open the possibility that I missed effects that were in the data.
Reliability for all the measures used was acceptable, so increasing my sample size would
be the only remaining way to improve power. Due to organizational constraints, I was
limited in the number of participants I could include in my Nursing sample. For the
Student sample, however, I obtained data for 100 more participants, without any changes
in my substantive findings nor much improvement in power.
Future Research
It would be interesting to see what effect the Detection/Consequence and
Reasoning warnings would have in a real-world, high-stakes selection context. All four
conditions could easily be inserted into a selection situation so applicants believed their
responses would affect their chances of getting hired (but of course none could count in
the selection process to ensure equitable treatment of applicants). Previous research
included incentives within the study in an attempt to artificially create a selection context
(the better applicants would receive money, for example). Awarding a financial incentive
to the best performers in this study could have affected my findings. It is important to
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remember, however, that the Honest and Faking manipulations did work as expected, so
it is possible this study successfully simulated a selection context. An examination of the
effect of financial or other incentives on results in a number of contexts would, however,
benefit research on the contextual influences to responses to non-cognitive measures used
for selection. Future research should also examine the effectiveness of a reasoning
warning in reducing faking behavior in a classification context.
Byle and Holtgraves (2008) found that the type of design used had an effect on
the magnitude of faking, with the between-subjects design having a smaller magnitude of
faking than a within-subjects design when compared to honest scores. A within-subjects
design where respondents complete two or more conditions would compliment this study
in a number of ways. First, a within-subjects design would improve the likelihood of
detecting significant experimental effects by increasing statistical power. Second, this
design would permit control of pre-existing trait levels on the personality variables
included, which I was unable to do. Third, within-subjects replication would examine
whether the effects seen in this study represent a lower-bound for the effects of the
Detection/Consequence warning, as well as further examine the effect of the Reasoning
warning on responding.
In order to better assess why I found no significant differences between group
means for the measures of procedural justice, it would be beneficial to expand this study
to include a cognitive test. With a cognitive test (or some other component of a selection
battery), there could be a condition in which the applicant takes no personality test. Such
a design would enable the researcher to examine if it is merely the presence of a
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personality test that affects the applicant’s perception of procedural justice, as in
McFarland (2003).
Conclusion
This study answered Dwight et al.’s (2003) call for researchers to explore the
effect of the integration of warnings into the selection process, providing three main
additions to the personality literature. The central purposes of this study were to examine
if the reasoning warning would be as effective as the Detection/Consequence warning in
reducing applicant faking behavior, as well as examine if the Reasoning warning was
more applicant-friendly in terms of procedural justice. The study adds to the wide range
of research on applicant faking behavior by being the first to compare a
detection/consequence warning to both faked and honest responses. Furthermore, it was
the first to compare the effectiveness of the reasoning warning to both faked and honest
responses, as well as responses obtained under a detection/consequence warning. Perhaps
researchers have not studied alternative warnings to reduce applicant faking behavior
because the Detection/Consequence warning is quite effective (at least within the
selection context). In this study, a reasoning warning did not elicit mean trait scores that
were significantly less socially desirable than faked responses. The reasoning warning
appears to be inappropriate within this selection context, but still may show promise for
other contexts (e.g. classification). Finally, my results suggest that explaining to
respondents the purpose for including a personality test in the selection battery, as done
through a reasoning warning, has no impact on respondent perceptions of procedural
justice.
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Appendix A
International Personality Item Pool Items*
1. Often feel blue
2. Feel comfortable around people
3. Am not interested in abstract ideas
4. Have a sharp tongue
5. Am always prepared
6. Dislike myself
7. Have little to say
8. Believe in the importance of art
9. Cut others to pieces
10. Pay attention to details
11. Rarely get irritated
12. Make friends easily
13. Do not like art
14. Have a good word for everyone
15. Waste my time
16. Am often down in the dumps
17. Keep in the background
18. Have a vivid imagination
19. Believe that others have good intentions
20. Find it difficult to get down to work
21. Have frequent mood swings
22. Am skilled in handling social situations
23. Avoid philosophical discussions
24. Suspect hidden motives in others
25. Get chores done right away
26. Seldom feel blue
27. Would describe myself as somewhat dull
28. Tend to vote for liberal political candidates
29. Get back at others
30. Carry out my plans
31. Feel comfortable with myself
32. Am the life of the party
33. Do not enjoy going to art museums
34. Respect others
35. Do just enough work to get by
36. Panic easily
37. Don’t like to draw attention to myself
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Appendix A (Continued)
38. Carry the conversation to a higher level
39.Accept people as they are
40. Don’t see things through
41. Am not easily bothered by things
42. Know how to captivate people
43. Tend to vote for conservative political candidates
44. Insult people
45. Make plans and stick to them
46. Am very pleased with myself
47. Don’t talk a lot
48. Enjoy hearing new ideas
49. Make people feel at ease
50. Shirk my duties
* Goldberg et al. (2006)
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Appendix B
Procedural Justice Questionnaire Items*
1. Have you been able to express your views and feelings during these procedures?
2. Have you had an influence over the outcome arrived at by these procedures?
3. Have these procedures been applied consistently?
4. Have these procedures been free of bias?
5. Have these procedures been based on accurate information?
6. Do you feel able to appeal the outcome arrived at by these procedures?
7. Have these procedures upheld ethical and moral standards?
* adapted from Colquitt (2001)

57

Appendix C
Selection Procedural Justice Scale Items*
1. Doing well on this test means a person can do the nursing job well.
2. A person who scored well on this test will be a good nurse.
3. I could really show my skills and abilities through this test.
4. This test allowed me to show what my job skills are.
5. This test gives applicants the opportunity to show what they can really do.
6. I was able to show what I can do on this test.
7. The content of the test did not appear to be prejudiced.
8. The test itself did not seem too personal or private.
9. The content of the test seemed appropriate.
10. It would be clear to anyone that this test is related to the nursing job.
11. The content of the test was clearly related to the nursing job.
* adapted from Bauer at al. (2001)
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Appendix D
Impression Management Scale*
1. I sometimes tell lies if I have to
2. I never cover up my mistakes
3. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone
4. I never swear
5. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget
6. I always obey laws, even if I’m unlikely to get caught
7. I have said something bad about a friend behind his or her back
8. When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening
9. I have received too much change from a salesperson without telling him or her
10. I always declare everything at customs
11. When I was young I sometimes stole things
12. I have never dropped litter on the street
13. I sometimes drive faster than the speed limit
14. I never read sexy books or magazines
15. I have done things that I don’t tell other people about
16. I never take things that don’t belong to me
17. I have taken sick-leave from work or school even though I wasn’t really sick
18. I have never damaged a library book or store merchandise without reporting it
19. I have some pretty awful habits
20. I don’t gossip about other people’s habits

* Paulhus (1991)
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